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Putting Kelo in Perspective 
ILYA SOMIN 
Kelo v. City of New London was in line with precedent, and within the 
“mainstream” of legal thought. But that is not enough to justify it. Like 
many of the Supreme Court’s worst decisions, it highlights the ways in 
which the mainstream can go disastrously wrong. Going forward, the best 
way to rectify Kelo’s errors is to overrule it completely, rather than rely on 
half-measures, such as building on Justice Anthony Kennedy’s hard to 
interpret concurring opinion. 
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Putting Kelo in Perspective 
ILYA SOMIN* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
More than ten years after it was decided, Kelo v. City of New London 
remains one of the modern Supreme Court’s most controversial rulings.1 
Although the Fifth Amendment only allows the taking of property for a 
“public use,”2 the Court ruled that it was permissible for the government to 
condemn private property for transfer to another private owner in order to 
promote “economic development.”3 The government was not even required 
to prove that the promised development was actually likely to materialize.4  
The Court’s decision produced a massive political backlash, with over 
80 percent of the public opposing the ruling.5 The debate generated by 
Kelo also undermined the previous seeming consensus in favor of an 
extremely broad definition of “public use” that, like the Kelo majority, held 
that virtually any potential public benefit qualifies.6 Although the Court 
ruled in favor of the government, it did so by a narrow 5-4 majority, over 
strong dissents by Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and Clarence Thomas, 
which helped legitimize the case for a narrow definition of “public use” in 
the eyes of the legal community. 
Wesley Horton played an important role in the Kelo story as the lawyer 
who successfully represented the City of New London before the Supreme 
Court. His essay for this symposium, coauthored with Brendon Levesque, 
is a valuable contribution to the ongoing debate over the decision, and 
public use doctrine more generally. I am also personally grateful to Mr. 
Horton for his generosity in offering his insights and recollections about 
the case while I was in the process of writing my recently published book 
The Grasping Hand: Kelo v. City of New London and the Limits of 
Eminent Domain. His assistance was both generous and extremely useful. 
It is all the more admirable because he offered it despite knowing that we 
                                                                                                                          
* Professor of Law, George Mason University. For helpful suggestions and comments, I would 
like to thank Wesley Horton and the editors of the Connecticut Law Review. 
1 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”). 
3 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489–90. 
4 Id. at 488–89. 
5 ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND: KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON AND THE LIMITS OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN 135–64 (2015).  
6 See id. at 112–34. 
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have very different views about the case.   
In this Essay, I assess Horton and Levesque’s analysis of several key 
aspects of Kelo. I agree with them that the Kelo decision was based on at 
least somewhat plausible reasoning that had significant support in 
mainstream legal thought and Supreme Court precedent. We also agree 
that it was less outrageous than the notorious Dred Scott case.7 However, 
as I explain in Part II, Horton and Levesque greatly underrate the 
weaknesses of the Kelo ruling and the broad definition of “public use” it 
endorses. 
Part III explains why Horton and Levesque are wrong to assume that 
their reform proposal building on Justice Anthony Kennedy’s concurring 
opinion in Kelo offers a better way to prevent eminent domain abuse than 
simply overruling the decision. 
Finally, Part IV notes some aspects of the Kelo story that Horton and 
Levesque downplay in their essay, which is too rosy in its appraisal of both 
the prospects for the success of the Kelo condemnations, and of the 
political forces behind them. The flaws of the Kelo takings exemplify, 
albeit in somewhat extreme form, the shortcomings of economic 
development and blight condemnations generally. 
II. ASSESSING KELO 
On one important point, Horton and Levesque, and I are largely in 
agreement. As they correctly point out, Kelo is “a part of the legal 
mainstream because it gives a reasonable and long-accepted reading of the 
Fifth Amendment.”8 Kelo’s broad interpretation of “public use” is similar 
to that adopted by the Supreme Court in the 1954 case of Berman v. 
Parker,9 and reaffirmed in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.10 Indeed, 
in some ways, Kelo was slightly less deferential to the government than 
these earlier precedents were.11 For example, Kelo does not reiterate 
Midkiff’s statement that the public use requirement is satisfied so long as 
“the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a 
conceivable public purpose.”12 
However, “reasonable and long-accepted” and “part of the legal 
mainstream” is not the equivalent of correct or logically sound reasoning. 
Many of the Supreme Court’s worst decisions were based on reasoning 
                                                                                                                          
7 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional 
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
8 Wesley W. Horton & Brendon P. Levesque, Kelo Is Not Dred Scott, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1405, 
1408 (2016). 
9 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
10 467 U.S. 229 (1984).  
11 See SOMIN, supra note 5, at 113–14 (describing this aspect of Kelo). 
12 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241. 
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that, at the time, was long-accepted and within the mainstream. They 
include such cases as Bowers v. Hardwick,13 Plessy v. Ferguson,14 and 
Buck v. Bell,15 all of which had strong mainstream support at the time they 
were decided, and were consistent with longstanding precedent and 
practice. Even Dred Scott, which Horton and Levesque strive mightily to 
differentiate from Kelo, was also based on theories that enjoyed 
considerable mainstream support in the 1850s.16 Historically, most of the 
Supreme Court’s worst decisions were not rulings that departed from the 
then-dominant mainstream, but rather cases where the mainstream itself 
went wrong. So it is with Kelo and the earlier public use precedents it 
relies on.  
The massive negative reaction to Kelo led the late Justice Antonin 
Scalia to compare it to Dred Scott. Both cases, he claimed, are decisions 
where the Court made “mistakes of political judgment, of estimating how 
far . . . it could stretch beyond the text of the constitution without 
provoking overwhelming public criticism and resistance.”17 Still, Horton 
and Levesque are surely right to conclude that the former is not as bad as 
the latter, if only because eminent domain abuse is a far lesser evil than 
Dred Scott’s expansion of slavery and denial of citizenship to even free 
blacks. In one important respect, however, the Supreme Court’s adoption 
of a broad definition of public use has actually exceeded the harm caused 
by Dred Scott, simply because it has lasted far longer.  
Dred Scott was only in force for a few years before it was overruled by 
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Even before that it helped 
cause the outbreak of the Civil War, which led to the Emancipation 
Proclamation and helped undermine the very evil that Chief Justice Roger 
Taney had sought to preserve. By contrast, the Supreme Court’s adoption 
of an ultra-broad definition of “public use” in the 1950s helped set the 
stage for blight and economic development takings that have forcibly 
displaced hundreds of thousands of people.18 While the political and 
judicial backlash generated by Kelo has helped curb such abuses,19 they are 
far from eliminated, and may not definitively end until Kelo and Berman v. 
Parker follow Dred Scott into the ash heap of history. 
Other than citing its “mainstream” nature and consistency with 
                                                                                                                          
13 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
14 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
15 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
16 See MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 126–29 
(2006) (documenting this point in great). 
17 Abdon M. Pallasch, Scalia Offers Ruling: Deep Dish v. Thin Crust, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Oct. 18, 
2011), http://www.suntimes.com/news/politics/8286260-418/scalia-offers-ruling-deep-dish-v-thin-
crust.html [http://perma.cc/V2PN-LC5T]. 
18 See SOMIN, supra note 5, at 73–111.  
19 See id. at 73–111, 181–203 (describing the political backlash to Kelo, and its limitations). 
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precedent, Horton and Levesque offer very little in the way of justification 
for Kelo. In particular, they almost completely neglect the extensive 
evidence that the broad definition of “public use” endorsed by the majority 
is inconsistent with leading versions of both originalism and “living 
constitution” theory. As explained more fully in my recent book about 
Kelo,20 the original meaning of “public use” better fits a narrow definition 
of the term, under which takings must be limited to the condemnation of 
property for government-owned projects, or for private entities that have a 
legal duty to serve the entire public, such as public utilities. The narrow 
definition best fits the available evidence from both 1791, when the Fifth 
Amendment was first adopted as part of the Bill of Rights,21 and 1868, 
when it became “incorporated” against state governments under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.22 
The narrow definition is also supported by leading versions of “living 
constitution” theory, most notably “representation-reinforcement,” which 
holds that the power of judicial review should be used to protect the poor, 
minorities, and other politically weak groups that cannot fend for 
themselves in the political process.23 The victims of eminent domain for 
private projects—who include hundreds of thousands of people—are 
overwhelming poor, politically weak, racial and ethnic minorities, or all 
three simultaneously.24 
Kelo also has major flaws that cut across specific approaches to 
constitutional theory. Most notably, its logic contains a deep internal 
contradiction:25 on the one hand, the majority recognizes that property 
owners have a constitutional right that protects their land from 
condemnation for a purely “private” use.26 But it then defers to the 
government in determining what qualifies as a sufficiently “public” project 
under the Public Use Clause.27 By so doing, the Court effectively put the 
definition of the rights protected by the Public Use Clause at the mercy of 
the very government officials it is supposed to protect us against. It is 
much like appointing a committee of foxes to guard the chicken coop.  
No other part of the Bill of Rights gets this sort of treatment. As Justice 
Thomas emphasizes in his Kelo dissent, the Court is willing to second-
guess legislative judgments “when the issue is . . . whether government 
may search a home” under the Fourth Amendment, yet it is unwilling to 
                                                                                                                          
20 For a detailed discussion of the relevant arguments and evidence, see id. at 35 –72.  
21 SOMIN, supra note 5, at 36–43, 61–63. 
22 Id. at 43. 
23 Id. at 100–02. The best-known defense of the theory is JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
24 SOMIN, supra note 5, at 86–90, 100–02.  
25 For a more detailed discussion of this point, see id. at 116–18.  
26 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477, 482. 
27 Id. at 483.  
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question “the infinitely more intrusive step of tearing down . . . homes.”28 
There is no reason to single out the Public Use Clause for such ultra-
deferential treatment. 
Horton and Levesque do not counter any of these points, nor offer 
much in the way of opposing considerations of their own. They emphasize 
that Kelo is consistent with precedent, which is true. But the precedents 
supporting it are Berman and Midkiff — poorly reasoned cases that offer 
little in the way of justification for adopting an ultrabroad definition of 
public use. These rulings also occurred during the period when judicial 
protection for constitutional property rights was at its nadir.29 Berman, in 
particular, was a badly flawed ruling. It authorized a “blight” 
condemnation that was part of a project that forcibly displaced some 5000 
poor African-Americans in Washington, DC at a time when poor blacks 
had almost no political power in the city and all for the sake of a highly 
dubious project.30 It also created a precedent that justified similar takings 
around the country forcibly displacing hundreds of thousands of people.31 
The reasoning of Berman and Midkiff is superficial, at best, and does not 
explain why an ultra-deferential approach to “public use” is justified on 
either originalist or living constitution grounds. Berman simply assumes 
that this is a field where deference is needed so that cities could benefit 
from the wisdom of “experts [who] concluded that if the community were 
to be healthy, if it were not to revert again to a blighted or slum area, as 
though possessed of a congenital disease, the area must be planned as a 
whole.”32 
Some might argue that even badly flawed precedents must be 
followed, so as to promote stability in constitutional decision-making. But, 
if applied consistently, that approach would require us to condemn many of 
the Court’s greatest decisions, which overruled or at least went against 
misguided previous precedent. Brown v. Board of Education is just one of 
many such examples.33 As a general rule, the case for adhering to flawed 
precedents in constitutional cases is much weaker than in statutory cases, 
since the latter can be corrected by new legislation, while only a 
constitutional amendment can fix misguided constitutional rulings. 
                                                                                                                          
28 Id. at 518 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
29 For a more detailed discussion of these precedents and their flaws, see SOMIN, supra note 5, at 
24–25, 86–88.  
30 On the effects of Berman, see id. at 86–87; Amy Lavine, Urban Renewal and the Story of 
Berman v. Parker, 42 URB. LAW. 423, 423–25 (2010). 
31 SOMIN, supra note 5, at 86–87; see also Wendell E. Pritchett, The ‘Public Menace’ of Blight: 
Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 5–23 (2003) 
(explaining the impact of Berman on later cases); Amy Lavine, Urban Renewal and the Story of 
Berman v. Parker, 42 URB. LAW. 423, 423–25 (2010) (same). 
32 Berman, 348 U.S. at 34. 
33 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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Recognizing this, the Supreme Court has laid out a series of admittedly 
imprecise standards for determining when constitutional decisions should 
be overruled.34 Kelo fits those standards extremely well, as (to a lesser 
degree) do Berman and Midkiff.35 
Moreover, as Justice Sandra Day O’Connor emphasizes in her 
dissenting opinion, Berman and Midkiff need not have been overruled 
completely in order to justify striking down “economic development” 
takings like the one at issue in Kelo.36 Instead, their logic could be limited 
to cases where the government seeks private investment to address a 
preexisting harm, such as “blight,” rather than create some new benefit, as 
in the case of economic development condemnations.37 This approach—
which has been adopted by several state supreme courts interpreting their 
states’ public use clauses, has a number of flaws. But it is far superior to 
the near-total judicial abdication advocated by the majority.38  
At the very least, it could serve as an intermediate step for a Court that 
might hesitate to immediately overrule longstanding precedent, but is also 
unwilling to simply leave the rights protected by the Public Use Clause 
completely at the mercy of state and local governments.39 Over time, a 
decision striking down economic development takings might be gradually 
expanded into a more complete restoration of the narrow approach to 
public use.  
In addition to Berman and Midkiff, Horton and Levesque also cite, as 
support for their position, early twentieth century cases such as Strickley v. 
Highland Boy Gold Mining Co.40 This is the “century” of precedent 
famously invoked by the Kelo majority opinion.41 Unfortunately, however, 
these precedents were not actually public use cases at all, but rather cases 
where the property owners tried to challenge state takings in federal court 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, at a time 
when the Court did not yet recognize the incorporation of the Bill of Rights 
against the states. When applying the Due Process Clause during this 
period, the Court took a deferential approach to state and local takings 
(though not as deferential as Kelo). But it also made clear that different and 
tighter standards applied in the rare cases where the Public Use Clause did 
apply during this era.42 In a November 2011 speech delivered after he 
                                                                                                                          
34 For a discussion of the relevant standards and how Kelo relates to them, see SOMIN, supra note 
5, at 238–41.  
35 See id. at 238–41. 
36 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 499–501 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
37 Id. at 500–01. 
38 For my detailed assessment of Justice O’Connor’s dissent, see SOMIN, supra note 5, at 127–31. 
39 Id. at 130–31. 
40 200 U.S. 527 (1906); Horton & Levesque, supra note 8, at 1415. 
41 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483. 
42 See SOMIN, supra note 5, at 123–26 (discussing this issue in detail). 
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retired from the Supreme Court, Justice John Paul Stevens, the author of 
the Kelo majority opinion, admitted that he had erred in conflating 
“substantive due process” and public use precedents, which he called an 
“embarrassing to acknowledge” mistake;43 Horton and Levesque recognize 
that Strickley (like other cases from this period relied on by the majority) 
was based on the Fourteenth Amendment. But they do not discuss the 
implications of this fact for their status as precedents relevant to Kelo.44 
Horton and Levesque briefly refer to the arguments I have made 
against the Kelo decision, but only to suggest that I “implicitly admit . . . 
that [my] case falls far short of conclusive.”45 If by “far short of 
conclusive” they mean that the evidence I cite does not justify the narrow 
view of public use with complete certainty, they are correct. But I do 
emphasize throughout the book that the cumulative evidence for it—on 
both originalist and living constitution grounds—far outweighs the case for 
the ultra-deferential approach endorsed in Kelo, Berman, and Midkiff.46 
Given two imperfect options, judges should choose the one supported by 
stronger evidence, or at least opt for an intermediate approach, such as 
Justice O’Connor’s, that does not leave an important constitutional right 
with virtually no judicial protection. 
One can try to justify Kelo on the basis of a theory of “Thayerian” 
deference, which holds that courts should not strike down legislation 
unless the unconstitutionality of the challenged law is so clear that it is 
“not open to rational question.”47 But, like the doctrine of near-total 
adherence to precedent, this would require us to bite bullets that few if any 
defenders of Kelo would care to digest. Among other things, it would 
require us to condemn cases like Brown v. Board48 and Loving v. 
Virginia,49 the 1967 ruling striking down laws banning interracial 
marriage. Both decisions are subject to at least reasonably plausible 
counterarguments on originalist and other grounds.50  
Horton and Levesque also suggest that Kelo may not be so bad because 
                                                                                                                          
43 See Justice John Paul Stevens, Kelo, Popularity, and Substantive Due Process, Albritton 
Lecture at the University of Alabama School of Law 16 (Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.supremecourt 
.gov/publicinfo/speeches/1.pdf [https://perma.cc/RD44-FGVQ]. He continues to believe that he got the 
decision right, albeit on grounds different from those stated in the opinion. Id. 
44 Horton & Levesque, supra note 8, at 1415 n.64. 
45 Id. at 1426 n.145. I should note that I am grateful to Horton and Levesque for calling my book 
“the best discussion” of the meaning of “public use.” Id. 
46 E.g., SOMIN, supra note 5, at 67–68, 72, 99–108.  
47 This theory dates back to an influential 1893 article by James Bradley Thayer. James B. 
Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARVARD L. REV. 
129, 144 (1893). For a recent history and evaluation of the theory, see Richard A. Posner, The Rise and 
Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 519 (2012). 
48
 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
49 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
50 For these comparisons and citations to relevant evidence, see SOMIN, supra note 5, at 69–70.  
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“[c]ity councilors who vote for an unpopular condemnation are likely to be 
voted out of office, especially since in the usual situation the taxpayers 
have to pay for the [condemned] property.”51 This is part of their general 
effort to defend Kelo on grounds of “federalism” and “democracy.”52 
There are two problems with these types of arguments. First, they are 
based on an unwarranted confidence in the effectiveness of the political 
process in controlling abusive takings. The long history of harmful blight 
and economic development takings strongly suggests that such confidence 
is misplaced. Political accountability did not prevent hundreds of 
thousands of people from being displaced by blight and economic 
development takings,53 just as it did not prevent the dubious takings that 
occurred in the Kelo case itself. Until the nationwide publicity generated 
by Kelo, most voters paid little or no attention to the details of takings 
policy. As a result, officials and interest groups had a free hand to engage 
in a variety of abusive practices.54  
The reforms produced by the enormous political backlash against Kelo 
have greatly improved matters in many states. But progress has been 
uneven, and in many jurisdictions state and local officials remain free to 
condemn property for almost any reason.55 
The second flaw in the federalism and democracy justifications for 
Kelo is even more fundamental: the same logic would justify judicial 
deference to state and local governments with respect to many other rights 
protected by the Bill of Rights. After all, many such rights often impinge 
on issues where varying local conditions may be relevant, and where local 
officials often have greater expertise than federal judges do. And it is 
always possible to argue that voters might curb abusive behavior. 
To adapt Justice Thomas’ example of the Fourth Amendment, Horton 
and Levesque’s reasoning might lead us to conclude that we do not need 
judicial intervention in this field because “[c]ity councilors who vote” to 
authorize unreasonable searches and seizures “are likely to be voted out of 
office, especially since in the usual situation the taxpayers have to pay for” 
the searches.56 Such reasoning is no more persuasive with regards to 
takings than searches and seizures, especially since both tend to target 
people with little political influence.57 
 Kelo is indeed not as bad as Dred Scott, certainly not in every way. 
                                                                                                                          
51 Horton & Levesque, supra note 8, at 1425. 
52 Id. 
53 See SOMIN, supra note 5, at 73–74. 
54 Id. 
55 For an overview of post-Kelo reform efforts and their limitations, see id. at 135–80. 
56 Horton & Levesque, supra note 8, at 1425. 
57 For a more extensive critique of “federalism” rationales for judicial deference on property 
rights issues, see SOMIN, supra note 5, at 118–20, 221–24; Ilya Somin, Federalism and Property 
Rights, 2011 U. OF CHI. LEGAL F. 53. 
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But it is bad enough to deserve severe criticism, and bad enough that the 
Supreme Court should overrule it as soon as possible. 
III. HORTON AND LEVESQUE’S PROPOSAL FOR REFORM 
Despite their general satisfaction with the outcome of Kelo, Horton and 
Levesque nonetheless suggest that there is a need for stronger judicial 
protection for property rights than that offered by the majority opinion. 
They present a reform proposal for greater judicial scrutiny of at least some 
takings, building on Justice Anthony Kennedy’s concurring opinion, which 
they view as a “template” for future reform efforts.58 Their idea is both a 
useful contribution to the debate over these issues and an interesting 
indication of the impact of Kelo on the legal community. It shows that, in 
the aftermath of the decision, even some experts who are generally 
sympathetic to the use of eminent domain still recognize the need for 
stronger safeguards against its abuse.59 
Kennedy’s concurring opinion is ambiguous on some key points, and 
therefore not easy to interpret.60 His most important conclusion is that 
courts should give less deference to the government in those public use 
cases where there is “a plausible accusation of impermissible favoritism to 
private parties.”61 Kennedy is far from clear on the subject of what, 
exactly, qualifies as “impermissible favoritism,” what counts as “plausible” 
evidence thereof, and exactly how stringent the courts’ review of the taking 
should be in cases where such a “plausible” accusation of favoritism has 
been raised.  
In addition to its lack of clarity, there is another obstacle to building on 
Kennedy’s opinion: because he chose to join the majority opinion as well 
as write his own separate concurrence, Kennedy’s analysis does not count 
as the controlling opinion in the case, and is not a binding precedent for 
lower courts.62 Making it binding would require a new Supreme Court 
ruling to that effect, though it might have some persuasive authority for 
lower courts without that.  
Nonetheless, Horton and Levesque propose a 10 factor balancing test 
for analyzing public use cases, which they see as “implicit” in Kennedy’s 
                                                                                                                          
58 Horton & Levesque, supra note 8, at 1418, 1425–27. 
59 For a discussion of other limited reform proposals produced by experts sympathetic to the 
outcome in Kelo, see SOMIN, supra note 5, at 204–31. 
60 For a discussion of the opinion and the difficulties it poses, see SOMIN, supra note 5, at 114–16.  
61 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 492 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
62 Had Kennedy concurred in judgment only and refused to join with the majority, his 
concurrence might have had controlling precedential force under Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 
(1977). Marks held that “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining 
the result enjoys the assent of five justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position 
taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.” Id. at 193 
(internal quotation omitted). 
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own position: “(1) Will a public body own or operate the property? (2) 
How specific is the stated use? (3) Is it reasonably possible the stated use 
will actually succeed? (4) Is the stated use clearly a pretext? (5) Does the 
public gain outweigh any private gain? (6) Is there clearly improper 
favoritism? (7) Is there clearly improper targeting of a disfavored group? 
(8) Is the particular property in question on the periphery of the project? 
(9) Is there a comprehensive plan that any private developer must follow? 
(10) Were any private beneficiaries known at the time of the vote to 
condemn?”63 
Some of these factors have previously been utilized by state and lower 
federal courts seeking to determine whether a taking is “pretextual” – the 
one category of takings that both Kennedy and the Kelo majority consider 
to violate the Public Use Clause.64 For example, some lower court 
decisions interpreting the pretextual takings standard look to the magnitude 
and distribution of the supposed public benefits, and others consider 
whether the condemning authority primarily intended to benefit a private 
party.65  
Nonetheless, Horton and Levesque’s approach has some notable 
shortcomings. Most obviously, nothing like this elaborate ten factor test 
can be discerned in either the text or the original meaning of the Public Use 
Clause, or even in Supreme Court precedents prior to Kelo. Perhaps the test 
might be justified on some version of living constitution theory. But 
Horton and Levesque do not explain how. Filling in this gap in their 
analysis might be a useful exercise for future efforts to build on their 
proposal, or others like it.  
A few of the factors advocated by Horton and Levesque are mentioned 
in Kelo as possible criteria for analyzing whether a pretextual taking has 
occurred.66 On the other hand, at least five of their criteria are nowhere 
indicated as possible indicators of pretext by either the Kelo majority or 
Justice Kennedy.67 One is even specifically rejected as an appropriate 
subject for judicial inquiry. Horton and Levesque’s suggestion that courts 
consider whether it is “reasonably possible [that] the stated use will 
actually succeed” is at odds with the Kelo majority’s stricture that courts 
                                                                                                                          
63 Horton & Levesque, supra note 8, at 1427. 
64 For an overview of the many conflicting post-Kelo precedents on pretextual takings, which fall 
into at least five distinctive schools of thought, see SOMIN, supra note 5, at 192–200. See also Daniel B. 
Kelly, Pretextual Takings: Of Private Developers, Local Governments, and Impermissible Favoritism, 
17 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 173, 176–77 (2009) (discussing these alternatives in detail). 
65See SOMIN, supra note 5, at 193–95 (reviewing relevant cases).  
66 For example, the Kelo majority stresses the supposed significance of the extent of the planning 
behind the taking. 545 U.S. at 469–70. Also, Justice Kennedy emphasizes the importance of the fact 
that identity of the private developer who would build the project was not known in advance. Id. at 
491–92 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
67 These are their first, second, third, seventh, and eighth criteria.  
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should not try to “second-guess the [government’s] considered judgments 
about the efficacy of its development plan . . . .”68 If this had been a 
relevant factor, it might well have led to the invalidation of the Kelo 
takings themselves, which were based on a badly flawed plan that 
predictably failed to pan out. To this day, the condemned property lies 
empty, used only by a colony of feral cats.69 
Adopting the Horton-Levesque approach to public use would therefore 
require significant revisions to Kelo, perhaps even to the point of 
overruling it. It would also require courts to fill in some important gaps in 
the Horton-Levesque test itself. Most obviously, what should a court do 
when some factors cut against the taking and others in favor of it? Should 
some factors in the test be weighed more heavily than others, or should all 
be considered equally?  
Some of the factors raised by Horton and Levesque are also internally 
ambiguous. For example, it is not clear what qualifies as evidence of 
“improper favoritism” or “improper targeting of a disfavored group” under 
their approach. Does it require a conscious intent on the part of the 
condemning authority, or merely subconscious bias?  
Similarly, it is difficult to tell who might qualify as a known private 
beneficiary of the taking. Some interpret this as referring only to whether 
the identity of the new owner of the condemned property is known in 
advance.70 But this approach ignores the possibility that a taking might be 
cooked up in order to benefit a powerful interest group that will not be the 
new owner, but rather an indirect beneficiary of the new use of the 
property.71 This issue arose in the Kelo case itself, where Pfizer, Inc., a 
large and politically influential pharmaceutical firm, played a major role in 
instigating the takings, even though it was never going to be the new owner 
of the condemned land, but merely expected to benefit from its new uses.72  
On one important point, Horton and Levesque may be right: unlike a 
ban on private takings for economic development or even a complete 
restoration of the narrow definition of public use, their approach might 
potentially give property owners protection against takings of all kinds, not 
merely those that transfer property to private parties.73 Abusive practices 
can and do occur even in the case of takings authorized under the narrow 
view of the Public Use Clause, a problem I discussed in some detail in my 
                                                                                                                          
68 Horton & Levesque, supra note 8, at 1426; Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488. 
69 On the shortcomings of the Kelo project, and its tragic outcome, see SOMIN, supra note 5, at 
235. 
70 See, e.g., Carole Media LLC v. New Jersey Transit Corp., 550 F.3d 302, 311 (3d Cir. 2008). 
71 See SOMIN, supra note 5, at 196.  
72 On Pfizer’s key role in the takings, see id. at 15–17; infra part IV . 
73 See Horton & Levesque, supra note 8, at 1426.  
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book on Kelo.74 Even if Kelo and Berman v. Parker are both reversed, such 
abuses may remain. 
However, that problem is no reason to forego the major gains that 
would result from banning blight and economic development takings, 
which would forestall future abuses of the sort that have already victimized 
many hundreds of thousands of people, and destroyed vast amounts of 
economic value. Moreover, there are often good reasons for treating 
takings for publicly owned projects and utilities more favorably than those 
for private development projects. Among other things, the former are more 
likely to encounter “holdout” problems that cannot be overcome without 
resort to coercion.75  
While the Horton-Levesque approach might protect us against a wider 
range of takings, it also offers far less security than the restoration of a 
narrow approach to public use. With respect to the takings it covers, the 
latter offers complete protection by means of a categorical rule. By 
contrast, the ten factor test might potentially be applied in ways that are 
highly deferential to the government, and allow many abusive takings to go 
forward. Because of the subjective and imprecise nature of many of the 
standards, judges who believe property rights are unimportant or otherwise 
unworthy of strong judicial protection could easily apply them in ways that 
give the government almost as much of a blank check as it gets under Kelo 
and Berman.  
For originalists, there is also the crucial point that failing to enforce the 
narrow definition of public use means going against the text and original 
meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Even if this approach is not the one that 
has the best policy consequences, it should be preferred over a balancing 
test with little if any grounding in the original meaning.  
But even for living constitutionalists, the narrow definition of public 
use might be more appealing than the Horton-Levesque theory. The 
former—unlike the latter—categorically bans a set of takings that have 
historically victimized the poor and politically weak. Moreover, living 
constitutionalists can potentially have their cake and eat it too: they could 
adopt the original meaning of public use in so far as it bans private takings 
for blight and economic development, and also apply the Horton-Levesque 
test (or some other balancing test) to traditional public use takings. This 
hybrid model could potentially combine the best of both worlds: banning 
private-to-private takings, while also at least partly curbing the abuse of 
traditional public use takings.  
I end my discussion of this issue on a point of agreement: Horton and 
Levesque are surely right that “[t]he bigger picture is condemnation in 
                                                                                                                          
74 SOMIN, supra note 5, at 225–31. 
75 See id. at 90–94 (discussing this issue in detail). 
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general, and private economic development is only a part of it.”76 But 
economic development takings (and the closely related blight takings) are 
an important part of that bigger picture. Completely eliminating them 
would be a major step in the right direction. For that, the Court needs to 
overrule Kelo and—eventually—Berman v. Parker. 
IV. THE LESSONS OF NEW LONDON 
For most Americans, the primary significance of the Kelo decision 
resides not in the specific takings it upheld, but in the broader 
constitutional principles at issue. Nonetheless, like Horton and Levesque, I 
believe that the specific facts of the case are important for a fuller 
understanding of its history. However, I take a less optimistic view than 
they do of the story behind the New London takings, and its implications 
for economic development condemnations generally.  
Horton and Levesque understandably emphasize points that make the 
New London takings seem justifiable, such as the fact that the officials 
who made the decision to condemn genuinely believed that it would 
promote economic growth, that the city was facing economic problems, 
and that the New London Development Corporation—the private entity 
that conducted the takings on behalf of the City—put together a detailed 
development plan.77 All of this is true. But Horton and Levesque also omit 
or downplay crucial facts that cut the other way. 
Most notably, they overlook the serious flaws in the plan that were 
evident from early on. As emphasized by the 2002 trial court decision, 
which invalidated 11 of the 15 planned condemnations, the NLDC had no 
clear plan for how to use the property, and the prospects of successfully 
completing the project were dubious at best.78 In a prescient dissenting 
opinion in the Connecticut Supreme Court, Justice Peter Zarella likewise 
pointed out that the NLDC plan was seriously flawed.79 As he emphasized, 
at the time of the condemnations, “there was no signed development 
agreement providing for the future exploitation of the condemned 
property,” a circumstance that greatly reduced the chances of actually 
producing any economic development, and made it “impossible to 
                                                                                                                          
76 Horton & Levesque, supra note 8, at 1427. 
77 Id. at 1408–10. 
78 See Kelo v. City of New London, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 789, at *229, *231 (2002) (noting 
that the NLDC development plan’s projected uses for the area were “so vague, shifting, and 
noncommittal” that the City could not prove that its condemnation was actually necessary to pursue the 
objectives of the development plan). 
79 Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 578–79 (2004) (Zarella, J. dissenting), aff’d, 545 
U.S. 469 (2005). 
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determine whether future development of the area primarily will benefit 
the public or even benefit the public at all.”80 
From early on, critics pointed out that the NLDC plan had serious 
shortcomings, which cast grave doubt on its prospects for success.81 
Despite Horton and Levesque’s claims to the contrary, it is highly unlikely 
that “without drawn-out litigation the plan might actually have 
succeeded.”82 To the contrary, the litigation merely revealed shortcomings 
that were already present. It was not the fault of the courts or of the 
resisting homeowners that the plan ultimately collapsed. 
Horton and Levesque also err in emphasizing the “holdout problems” 
that supposedly justified the use of eminent domain.83 It is true that there 
were holdout problems in the sense that the NLDC could not have acquired 
all of the property it wanted without resorting to coercion. But it is not true 
that there was a holdout problem in the sense that they actually needed to 
acquire every single property in order to carry out an effective 
redevelopment plan. Virtually all the facilities specifically envisioned by 
the NLDC could have been built without forcing out resisting property 
owners who did not wish to sell.84 In an amicus brief focusing on this 
issue, prominent University of Chicago Law School takings scholar 
Richard Epstein pointed out that “holdouts [were] a complete nonproblem” 
in Fort Trumbull because property already owned by the government in the 
area was more than large enough to contain all the new facilities 
envisioned in the plan.85 
NLDC and Pfizer leaders, however, believed that all of the homes and 
businesses in the neighborhood had to be destroyed for what were 
essentially aesthetic reasons. For example, NLDC President Claire 
Gaudiani stated that they had to be eliminated because otherwise they 
would have looked “ugly and dumb.”86 Her husband, David Burnett, a 
high-ranking Pfizer employee, told a reporter that the houses had to be 
destroyed because “Pfizer wants a nice place to operate,” and “we don’t 
want to be surrounded by tenements.”87 
This brings us to Pfizer’s crucial role in the condemnations. Horton 
and Levesque note Pfizer’s role only to point out that the condemnations 
were undertaken in conjunction with Pfizer’s construction of a 
                                                                                                                          
80 Kelo, 843 A.2d 500, 596 (Conn. 2004) (Zarella, J., dissenting), aff’d, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).  
81 See SOMIN, supra note 5, at 29–30, 235 (discussing the plan’s flaws). 
82 Horton & Levesque, supra note 8, at 1410. 
83 Id. 
84 SOMIN, supra note 5, at 17 (endnote omitted).   
85 Brief of the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 23, Kelo v. City of 
New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
86 SOMIN, supra note 5, at 17 (endnote omitted). Other NLDC and Pfizer officials made similar 
statements. Id.  
87 Id. (endnote omitted). 
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headquarters nearby, which was in fact built.88 They stress that the project 
itself was planned by the NLDC and approved by the City.  
This, however, understates the true extent of Pfizer’s involvement. 
Although Pfizer was not scheduled to be the new owner of the condemned 
property, it did hope to benefit from the upper-income housing and office 
space that might be built there. For that reason, it played an important part 
in instigating the takings. 
The NLDC itself had close links to Pfizer. As already noted, NLDC 
President Claire Gaudiani was the wife of a high-ranking Pfizer employee. 
George Milne, a Pfizer executive, was also a member of the NLDC board, 
and played an important early role in the project, though he eventually 
recused himself.89 Perhaps more importantly, Pfizer played a major role in 
lobbying for the condemnations at both the state and local levels and in 
tailoring the details of the development plan to serve its interests.90 James 
Hicks, executive vice president of a firm that helped develop the NLDC 
plan, stated that Pfizer was the “10,000 pound gorilla” behind the project.91 
Pfizer’s key role in the process does not prove that NLDC and City 
leaders deliberately sacrificed the public interest in order to benefit a 
powerful corporation.92 I believe they truly thought that they were doing 
the right thing for the community. Nevertheless, it is hard to believe that 
their (sincere) views about the public interest were completely 
uninfluenced by their close ties to Pfizer, or by the firm’s extensive 
lobbying for the project. At the very least, the City should not have 
allowed the development plan to be produced by an organization whose 
leaders had such close ties to Pfizer—ties that created a significant 
potential conflict of interest.  
Finally, Horton and Levesque do not mention the extensive campaign 
of extralegal harassment and intimidation that the NLDC waged against 
property owners who refused to sell their land “voluntarily.” In addition to 
the threat of eminent domain itself, that campaign included such 
shenanigans as dumping dirt and debris on their property, breaking into 
homes, forcibly evicting tenants, and constant late-night phone calls, 
among other pressure tactics.93 
The sad history of the Kelo condemnations does not necessarily prove 
that they were unconstitutional. Many abusive and unjust government 
                                                                                                                          
88 Horton & Levesque, supra note 8, at 1410. 
89 SOMIN, supra note 5, at 15; Lucette Lagnado, Disconnecticut: Needy New London Saw Cure 
for Its Ills In Pfizer’s Arrival, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 10, 2002), at A1. 
90 SOMIN, supra note 5, at 15–17.  
91 Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 537 (2004).   
92 See SOMIN, supra note 5, at 17. 
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policies do not violate the Constitution. But the story does shed some light 
on some of the broader issues at stake in the Kelo litigation.  
Perhaps most importantly, it highlights the reality that an extensive 
planning process provides little if any assurance that economic 
development takings will actually produce public benefits. Neither does it 
guard against the exertion of undue influence by private interest groups, 
such as Pfizer. If anything, a long and complex planning process 
advantages powerful political insiders relative to the politically weak. The 
former can more easily find ways to influence the plan, and also are more 
likely to have the resources needed to fight prolonged political and legal 
battles.94 These factors also count against Horton and Levesque’s reform 
proposal, in so far as it relies on the planning process to ferret out possible 
favoritism and ensure that the condemnations will produce the promised 
development that supposedly justified the use of eminent domain in the 
first place. 
Finally, the extralegal harassment endured by the property owners and 
the huge asymmetries of resources between them and NLDC and the City 
underscore the need for strong legal protections to level the playing field. 
But for the intervention of the Institute for Justice, the libertarian public 
interest firm that represented the New London property owners pro bono, 
they would have had to give up their struggle early on, probably long 
before it even got to court.95  
Ideally, those protections should take the form of clear, simple rules 
barring economic development takings rather than relatively vague 
standards and balancing tests that fail to provide clear guidance to judges, 
and could lead to prolonged, expensive litigation. Such legal battles are 
often beyond the means of poor and lower-middle class owners, whereas 
the Pfizers and NLDCs of the world can bear the costs far more easily.  
V. CONCLUSION 
More than a decade after Kelo, the debate generated by the decision 
continues. Horton and Levesque’s essay is a valuable contribution to that 
ongoing discussion. At this point, we are far from reaching a consensus on 
the proper scope of government power to condemn property and the extent 
to which courts should intervene to protect property owners against its use. 
But Kelo and the reaction against it have at the very least shifted the 
parameters of the debate, lending newfound respectability to the idea that 
the Public Use Clause is more than just a mere fig leaf. 
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